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Abstract—Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs) have attracted the
attentions of academia and industry, which is expected to become
the next-generation memory. However, due to the nonvolatile
property, NVMs become vulnerable to attacks and require
security mechanisms, e.g., counter mode encryption and integrity
tree, which introduce the security metadata. NVMs promise to
recover these security metadata after a system crash, including
the counter and integrity tree. However, unlike merkle tree
reconstructed from user data, recovering SGX integrity tree (SIT)
has to address the challenges from unique top-down hierarchical
dependency. Moreover, writing overhead and recovery time are
important metrics for evaluating persistent memory system due
to the high costs of NVM writes and IT downtime. How to
recover the security metadata, i.e., counter blocks and integrity
tree nodes, with low write overhead and short recovery time,
becomes much important.
To provide a fast recovery scheme with low write overhead,
we propose STAR, a cost-efficient scheme for recovering counter
blocks and SGX integrity tree nodes after crashes. For fast
recovery and verification, STAR synergizes the MAC and correct
data, uses bitmap lines in ADR to indicate the location of stale
node and constructs a cached merkle tree to verify the correctness
of the recovery process. Moreover, STAR uses a multi-layer index
to speed up the recovery process. STAR also allows different
configurations to meet adaptive requirements for write overhead
and recovery time. Our evaluation results show that the proposed
STAR reduces the number of memory writes by up to 87%
compared with state-of-the-art work, Anubis, which needs extra
1x memory writes. For a 4MB security metadata cache, STAR
needs 0.039s/0.023s/0.004s in three different configurations to
recover the metadata cache while Anubis needs 0.020s.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) is promising to become
the main devices of next-generation memory systems, due
to high density, near-zero standby power, non-volatile and
byte-addressable features. NVM however suffers from some
drawbacks, such as limited cell endurance [14], [20], [32],
[36] and asymmetric read and write latencies [25], [35].
More importantly, NVM suffers from more severe security
vulnerabilities than DRAM due to its non-volatile feature.
After physically stealing DIMM, an attacker can easily read
the contents from another computer due to retaining data after
power off in NVM. To protect the user data from attacks, an
intuitive solution is to leverage data encryption and integrity
verification, which introduces extra security metadata, i.e.,
counter blocks and integrity tree nodes. In general, recovering
these metadata from system crashes is important to NVM [37]
to efficiently support further execution of original applications.
How to recover these security metadata in the persistent
memory system has been widely discussed in recent works [4],
[31], [33], [37].
Due to hiding the decryption latency, counter mode en-
cryption scheme (CME) [17] for secure memory systems [3],
[27], [34], [40] becomes more efficient via one-time padding
than direct encryption via AES. However, in practice, data
encryption becomes insufficient to ensure the security of
persistent memory, since attackers can modify the encrypted
data/counters without authorization. The persistent system
obtains useless plaintext by decrypting these modified cipher-
text data/counters. To detect the unauthorized modifications,
Message Authentication Code (MAC) is used to associate data
with their counters. A MAC is stored with a data line. Any
modification in a counter, data or MAC can be detected by
comparing the stored MAC with computed one. Unfortunately,
attackers can replace the new data, counter and MAC with
old tuple, which is called data replace attack. To detect this
attack, an integrity tree is introduced into memory systems [4],
[22], [37]. The counter blocks are hashed to generate the
MACs that are further hashed iteratively until generating a
root node that is stored on-chip non-volatile register, which is
called Bonsai Merkle Tree (BMT) [22]. Unlike BMT, there is
another integrity tree, i.e., SGX integrity tree (SIT) [9], [28].
Each node in a traditional SIT consists of 8 counters and one
MAC, and the MAC is generated by hashing the 8 counters
and one corresponding counter in the father node (detailed in
Section II-C). SIT updates MACs in each node in parallel,
while BMT updates MACs in the same branch sequentially.
The security metadata generally include both counter blocks
and integrity tree nodes, which need to be recoverable to
ensure the system security after system recovery. Persistent
memory recovery requires short recovery time and low run-
time overhead, especially in terms of the number of memory
writes. In Amazons cloud system, the downtime costs are up
to 2 million dollars per minute [1] and the average costs of
IT downtime are 5,600 dollars per minute [2]. Long recovery
time makes the recovery scheme inefficient and the persistent
data fail to be recovered eventually [4]. The naive recovery
approach is to persist every changed node in metadata cache,
i.e., strict persistence scheme [4], [37]. The applications can
run immediately after system reboot without recovery process
in the strict persistence scheme. However, this scheme causes
all the integrity tree nodes in the branch (even tens of levels)
from leaf node to the tree root changed with user data to be
written. In this case, all changed nodes have to be persisted
in strict persistence scheme thus hurting the lifetime of NVM
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
04
72
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 D
ec
 20
19
and incurring long writing latency.
Unlike strict persistence schemes, Osiris [33] recovers
counter blocks with low writing overhead on execution time
by relaxing counter block persistence and retrying counter
multiple times during recovery process to obtain the correct
one. However, Osiris only focuses on counter recovery and
fails to recover the integrity tree. To recover the integrity
tree, Triad-NVM [4] reconstructs the whole merkle tree from
the bottom up and persists the lowest N level nodes with
data to trade off the number of memory writes with recovery
time. However, Triad-NVM fails to be used in SIT, since the
MAC in an SIT node can’t be recalculated by the child nodes
but relies on the correct counters in its own and the father
node, which invalidates the bottom-up recovery approach.
Furthermore, Anubis [37] provides a fast recovery scheme for
SIT. With each memory write (user data, counter block or SIT
node), there is a metadata node changed in metadata cache,
i.e., counter block or SIT node. Anubis uses a shadow table
(ST) block to record the address of the changed metadata,
the changed MAC and the Least Significant Bits (LSBs) of
8 counters in the changed node. The ST block is further
written into NVM. Anubis could fast recover the SIT by only
recovering the changed SIT nodes that are not flushed into
persistent memory before system crashes according to the ST
block, instead of recovering all the SIT nodes. However, Anu-
bis incurs 2 times writes as described in [37], including normal
memory writes and additional ST block writes, compared with
traditional memory systems. More writes will hurt the lifetime
of NVM and increase execution latency.
To fast recover the security metadata after system crashes
with low write overhead, we propose STAR (SIT trace and
recovery scheme) focusing on SIT, since its parallelizable
MAC-computing provides good performance. STAR is flexible
and adaptive to different configurations to obtain cost-efficient
tradeoff between write overhead and recovery time, while
delivering high performance, as shown in section III-B. STAR
flushes the modified metadata node in cache by our proposed
ahead write approach when a memory write causes changes
in this metadata node. STAR also supports metadata to be
restored and verifies the correctness of recovery process.
To facilitate fast recovery, we need to address main three
problems:
1) The correctness of data. Some security metadata in
NVM are stale since the latest metadata in cache have
not been flushed before crashes. Thus we need to restore
these stale security metadata using the correct data on
recovery. Different schemes have different approaches to
obtain the correct data after system crashes. The strict
persistence scheme doesn’t need to obtain correct data
since the security metadata have been already newest
in NVM. Anubis stores the correct data in the shadow
table block for SIT and flushes it with each memory
write. Triad-NVM [4] obtains the upper-level MACs in a
merkle tree by hashing the consistent lower-level MACs.
cc-NVM [31] and Osiris [33] retry the counter multiple
times and verify if the restored counter is correct or not
according to ECC and MAC.
2) The locations of stale data. Obtaining the correct data
only ensures that the security metadata could be recov-
ered after crashes, with the cost of a long recovery time
if the system restores all security metadata. With the aid
of the locations of stale security metadata, a system only
needs to restore the stale nodes, significantly reducing
the recovery time. In existing works, Anubis records the
addresses of stale nodes in the ST block; Triad-NVM
flushes N low-level integrity tree nodes with user data
and treats all upper-level nodes to be stale. Osiris doesn’t
record the locations of stale counter blocks. On recovery,
Anubis only needs to restore the marked stale metadata,
Triad-NVM needs to reconstruct the whole tree from the
persistent low-level metadata, and Osiris needs to restore
all counter blocks.
3) The efficiency of verification. Attackers can modify
or replace a persistent memory line during recovery
process. A verification mechanism is needed to ensure
the correctness of the recovery. For a merkle tree, the
root can be used to verify the correctness of recovery
due to exhibiting each data change. But for the SIT
lazy scheme [23], [28] (described in Section II-C), SIT
root can’t verify the correctness of recovery due to
failing to reflect the data changes immediately, and thus
extra verification mechanism is needed to ensure the
correctness of recovery process.
To address the above problems, STAR stores the correct
data, i.e., the correct counter of one node, in unused space
of MAC in the child nodes (Section III-C). We observe that
the memory writes from the user data cache have high spatial
locality. Based on this insight, STAR places several bitmap
lines in ADR to indicate which metadata line is stale in NVM
(Section III-D). STAR constructs a cache-tree and uses the
cache-tree root to verify the recovery process (Section III-E).
To accelerate the recovery process, STAR introduces a multi-
layer index structure to selectively read the useful bitmap lines
in the NVM recovery area (Section III-F).
To evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme, we
use Gem5 [5] with NVMain [19] to implement STAR, and
run 8 benchmarks from SPEC2006 suite [11] and 5 persistent
workloads widely used in state-of-the-art works [8], [12],
[13], [18], [21], [38]. Our experimental results show that
STAR incurs 1.13x/1.29x/2.01x memory writes of three con-
figurations compared with traditional memory systems while
one state-of-the-art work, Anubis, incurs 2x memory writes.
With the different numbers of memory writes, STAR needs
0.039s/0.023s/0.004s recovery time for a 4MB metadata cache,
while Anubis needs 0.020s. Moreover, the recovery time in
STAR is only a function of the number of dirty nodes in
metadata cache instead of memory and cache sizes, which
offers the adaptability for the larger NVM and metadata cache.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• A new metadata write approach. We propose a new
metadata cache write approach, called Ahead Write
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Fig. 1. Different encryption schemes.
(AW). When a user data/metadata write causes its father
node changed, the AW approach flushes the changed node
with the user data/metadata and ensures the metadata
consistency in NVM.
• Counter-MAC synergization for restoring stale meta-
data. We reuse the unused bits in the MAC in one node
to store the correct metadata of its father node, which
offers a new approach to restore stale metadata without
any extra memory writes.
• Bitmap lines for locating stale metadata. To efficiently
locate the stale metadata with low write overhead, we
propose bitmap lines to absorb the location information.
Using the bitmap lines to record location is useful for the
applications with the high spatial locality.
• Experimental evaluation. We have implemented and
evaluated STAR, and experimental results show STAR
reduces the number of memory writes by up to 87% with
comparable recovery time compared with state-of-the-art
work Anubis. STAR can also provide shorter recovery
time with incurring negligible write overhead compared
with Anubis.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we present the background of recovering
secure persistent memory and the motivation of our design.
A. Threat Model
In general, the processor chip is considered to be secure [3],
[4], [18], [22], [29], [33], [37]. An attacker can attack the
memory via multiple methods, such as scan the memory, snoop
the memory bus and steal DIMM to obtain the user data,
which exacerbate the data confidentiality. Attackers can also
replay memory data and tamper with memory contents, which
undermine the data integrity. Other attacks such as access
pattern leakage, power analysis and side-channel attacks, are
beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Counter Mode Encryption
Since NVMs retain data after power failure, information
leakage in NVMs is more severe than the volatile DRAM. User
data encryption is necessary to protect data confidentiality. The
data encryption can be processed in memory side [6] or pro-
cessor side [29]. However, in the memory side encryption, the
plaintext data should pass the memory bus and can be snooped
by attackers. Thus state-of-the-art works use the encryption
in the processor side [3], [27], [34], [40]. A straightforward
method in the processor side to encrypt a memory line is
to use a block cipher algorithm, e.g., AES, with a global
key, as shown in Fig. 1(a). However, this straightforward
Data block  
 
 
Merkle tree block
Root on chip
Data block
Counter block
Bonsai Merkle tree block
Root on chip
(a) Merkle tree (b) Bonsai Merkle tree
Fig. 2. Different bottom-up integrity trees. (a) Merkle tree starts hashing from
data blocks; (b) Bonsai Merkle tree starts hashing from counter blocks.
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Fig. 3. SGX integrity tree (SIT) that generating the MAC by hashing node
address, all counters in this node and one corresponding counter in the father
node.
encryption has some limitations. Due to the unchanged keys,
attackers can easily break the encryption using dictionary
attack. Besides, the decryption process is on the read critical
path. The ciphertext data read from NVM need to be decrypted
first, which introduces a long decryption latency.
Counter mode encryption (CME) is proposed to compensate
for the above drawbacks of straightforward encryption. As
shown in Fig. 1(b), CME first uses counter, data line address
and a global key to generate a one-time padding (OTP) via
the AES algorithm. For memory writes, the cache line to be
written needs to be encrypted by XORing the plaintext data
with OTP. For memory reads, OTP is generated in parallel
with reading memory line, and the plaintext data are obtained
by XORing the line and OTP. Thus the decryption latency
is hidden by the latency of reading data. To provide high
security, OTP will be not reused. To meet this requirement,
OTP generation uses three inputs, i.e., the line address, counter
and key. Different data lines have different addresses, which
allows the OTPs between different lines not to be reused. On
the same line, each memory write causes its counter increased,
thus OTP will not be reused in the same line at different writes.
Usually, each counter block contains 64 7-bit minor counters
and one 64-bit major counter. One counter block covers 64
user data blocks, i.e., one page. CME encrypts data blocks
using corresponding minor counter and major counter. When
one minor counter overflows, the major counter is increased
by one. All the minor counters are reset and the data blocks
in this page need to be re-encrypted. The 64-bit major counter
never overflows throughout the lifespan of an NVM since the
count range, i.e., 264 ≈ 1020, is far larger than the endurance
limit of NVM cell, e.g., 107-109 for PCM [20], [36] and 108-
1012 for ReRAM [15], [16].
C. Integrity Tree
Integrity trees are widely used in memory systems to
protect data integrity, e.g., merkle tree, bonsai merkle tree
(BMT) and SGX integrity tree (SIT) [9], [10], [22], [28]. As
shown in Fig. 2(a), several data blocks are hashed together to
generate MAC using a cryptographic hash function stored in
the processor. Higher level MAC is generated by hashing lower
level MACs together and finally, the merkle tree is formed with
one 64B hash root stored on chip. Bonsai merkle tree generates
the first MAC level by hashing counter blocks instead of user
3
data as shown in Fig. 2(b). Since the number of counter blocks
is far smaller than that of user data blocks, bonsai merkle
tree has fewer leaf nodes and lower heights than merkle trees.
Since each MAC in one node needs its child node MACs as
inputs, the (bonsai) merkle trees calculate their MACs serially,
i.e., the tree can’t calculate one MAC before completing the
computing upon the MACs of its child nodes.
Different from merkle tree and bonsai merkle tree, SIT node
contains 8 56-bit counters and one 64-bit MAC [28] instead of
hash values. As shown in Fig. 3, the MAC in each SIT node
is generated by hashing the node address, the counters in this
node and one corresponding counter in the father node. SIT
can calculate different level MACs in parallel as long as these
counters have been increased correctly.
When a user data block is written from cache to memory,
(bonsai) merkle tree needs to change all nodes in the branch
from the data block to the root and finally, the root is modified
to show the changes of data. Unlike (bonsai) merkle tree, SIT
has two options to update the tree nodes, including lazy and
eager schemes. In the lazy scheme, once a data block, i.e.,
user block, counter block or SIT node, is flushed into NVM, its
ancestor SIT nodes up to the first cache hit are cached to verify
the integrity of the flushed data block. Then the corresponding
counter in the father node is increased, and the MAC in the
flushed block is modified due to the increased corresponding
counter. The ancestor nodes including the root are unchanged,
and they are modified only when their dirty child nodes in
cache gets evicted later. Thus the SIT root is not modified
immediately with the changes of data and intermediate nodes
in the lazy scheme. Moreover, the eager scheme is to propagate
the changes to the root and modify root immediately when one
data block or SIT node is evicted into NVM. The root shows
the data changes and has higher probability of overflowing
since each data write, no matter where it is written, causes a
counter to be increased in the root. In this paper, we use the
lazy approach to update the SIT as Synergy [24], Vault [28]
and Anubis [37].
D. The MAC in Persistent Memory
SIT uses MAC stored in a node to associate counters in this
tree node with one counter in its father node. Any unauthorized
modifications over these counters and MAC could be detected.
The user data also needs MAC to associate the data with
encryption counters by hashing the data, block address and
corresponding counter to generate the MAC. Without the
MAC, the illegal modification in the user data can’t be detected
and the wrong data will be used by CPU after decryption.
When reading, the integrity of user data needs to be verified
using MAC. To avoid the failure of integrity checking on
recovery, MAC needs to be written into NVM with the new
user data. MAC is logically placed with the user data line, but
physically placed in another MAC memory line. To reduce
the MAC memory line access, especially memory line writing,
Synergy [24] stores the MAC in the 9th chip, in which ECC is
previously stored. Synergy reads/writes the data and MAC in
one memory access. In this paper, we use the result of Synergy
Node C
Node B
Node A
(a) Partial of SIT in metadata cache
Transaction 1:
Log (Node A);
Write (Node A);
End
Transaction 2:
Log (Node A);
Write (Node A);
Log (Node B);
Write (Node B);
End
Transaction 3:
Log (Node A);
Write (Node A);
Log (Node B);
End
(b) Three log schemes
Fig. 4. Using log schemes to persist the SIT nodes.
to store the data and MAC in one line instead of two memory
lines.
In general, the size of MAC is 64 bits [28]. However, 54-bit
MAC is also secure as described in Morphable Counters [23].
There are 10 unused bits in a 64-bit MAC space now. We will
reuse these unused bits in our design.
E. Motivation
The state-of-the-art works provide the metadata recovery
schemes in the persistent memory after system crashes, e.g.,
Osiris [33] and Triad-NVM [4], which fail to support SIT
recovery, and Anubis [37], which needs high write overhead.
Osiris relaxes the counter block persistence during system
running time. After system crashes, Osiris recovers the stale
counter block by retrying the counter from the stale counter
to stale counter+N, checks the correctness of this counter
recovery by ECC and finally detects the data replace attack
by using merkle tree root stored on chip. However, on SIT,
the root on chip doesn’t reflect the latest data in memory.
Attackers can simply replace the data, MAC and ECC with old
tuple on recovery and this data replacement can’t be verified
when Osiris is used for SIT. Osiris also needs a long time to
recover the counter blocks due to failing to distinguish the stale
counter blocks and restoring all counters. Triad-NVM flushes
multiple-level merkle tree nodes with the user data into NVM.
The merkle tree recovery on Triad-NVM needs to reconstruct
the whole merkle tree and compare the reconstructed root with
the root stored on chip. But SIT can’t be constructed from the
leaves. Without the correct corresponding counter in the father
node, the MAC in one node even cannot be computed. For
Triad-NVM, although the low-level nodes in the merkle tree
are unnecessary to be recovered, reconstructing the whole tree
has to consume a long time.
Anubis provides fast recovery schemes for both merkle tree
and SGX integrity tree. For a merkle tree, when a metadata
block in cache is marked dirty from a clean state, an extra
block with this dirty block address is written into NVM. For
the SGX integrity tree, each metadata write from cache into
memory will incur an extra block write containing the address,
the LSB of counters and MAC of the father node of the written
metadata block. The recovery scheme in Anubis for SIT has
2 times writes compared with normal write-back scheme,
increasing the application execution time and reducing the
lifetime of NVM.
A log is usually used to provide the data consistency, e.g.,
redo log and undo log. For redo log, the new data is first
written into the log and then the old data is updated in-place.
If a system crash occurs during writing log, the old data in-
place is consistent; if the crash occurs during updating old
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modifications of counters in metadata cache. 2© When the metadata with
counter-MAC synergization are flushed by Write Ahead approach, their
dirty/clean states are recorded in bitmap lines. 3© Bitmap lines are flushed into
recovery area by LRU policy. Cache-tree exhibits each change in metadata
cache.
data, the inconsistent old data can be recovered according
to the new data recorded in the log. An undo log is also
used to recover the inconsistent data by the old data in a
log. However, SIT cannot use logs to ensure the consistency
between two SIT nodes. As shown in Fig. 4(a), node B is
the father node of node A and node C is the father node of
node B. The metadata cache needs to evict the node A due to
the cache replacement policy. Fig. 4(b) shows three different
log schemes for persisting node A. Transaction 1 ensures the
node A itself in NVM is consistent. However, the node B has
been modified due to the eviction of its child node A. After
system crashes, node B in NVM is inconsistent to its copy
in cache and needs to be restored. Transaction 2 provides
the consistency of both nodes A and B, but the node C is
inconsistent if system crashes occurred. Transaction 3 writes
the node A and logs the node B. When a crash occurred,
although the node B is inconsistent, it could be restored from
the log. This transaction provides the consistency of nodes
A and B. This log scheme is similar with Anubis, i.e., when
writing node A, Anubis uses the ST node to record and restore
the modified node B while Transaction 3 uses the log.
In this paper, we focus on SIT and counter mode encryption
to propose a new scheme, i.e., STAR, to reduce the extra block
writes on running time with fast recovery after system crashes.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we describe the design details of STAR in
the context of the SGX integrity tree in NVM.
A. STAR Overview
A naive approach to recover the security metadata after
crashes is to use strict persistence scheme that persists all
the nodes in a branch from counter block to the root. This
scheme needn’t to restore metadata after crashes since the
metadata has been consistent in NVM. However, the strict
persistence scheme incurs many memory writes, hurting the
lifetime of NVM and performance during running time. In
the context of SIT, our STAR provides configurations to meet
different requirements on write overhead and recovery time.
As shown in Fig. 5, STAR consists of Ahead Write approach
(AW), counter-MAC synergization in metadata cache, bitmap
lines and cache-tree. Any data flushing from the last level
cache (or metadata cache) into NVM causes the modifications
of its father node in metadata cache ( 1 ). Counter-MAC
NVM  
 
Metadata cache
flushed
read
dirty node
one counter modified
Fig. 6. An SIT node becomes/stays dirty when its dirty child node is evicted
from metadata cache.
synergization leverages the unused bits in MAC space of one
node to store the LSBs of modified counter in its father node.
On recovery, the stale node could be restored from its child
node. When metadata nodes (counter blocks and SIT nodes)
are evicted from metadata cache, the AW approach is used to
flush the metadata and the state of metadata node is recorded in
bitmap lines ( 2 ).The AW approach provides the consistency
between metadata in cache and their copies in NVM by ahead
writing the modified father node of the flushed metadata.
Although the AW approach is used, the stale nodes also need
to be recovered, and the correctness of recovery process should
be verified, i.e., whether an attack occurs during the recovery
process. The bitmap lines are used to record the locations of
nodes whose states changed, especially indicating which node
is dirty, to provide fast recovery feature of STAR. Bitmap lines
are stored in an ADR region in the memory controller and
flushed into the recovery area in NVM by LRU policy ( 3 ).
Finally, the cache-tree in metadata cache shows the changes in
each location in the metadata cache. When the last level cache
or metadata cache writes incur the changes in metadata cache,
e.g., the metadata modification and eviction, the cache-tree
and its root will be modified to show the metadata changes.
During recovery, the cache-tree with bitmap lines is used to
detect whether an attack occurs during the recovery process.
We further introduce the main components of STAR.
B. Ahead Write Approach
As shown in Fig. 6, when a dirty metadata node is evicted
from cache, if its father node is not in cache, the father node
and ancestor nodes need to be cached until the first metadata
cache hit to verify the integrity of the evicted node. Then in
the father node, the corresponding counter of the flushed one
is increased by one. We observe that an SIT node will be
modified when its dirty child node is evicted from metadata
cache. If a clean node has been evicted from cache, its father
TABLE I
THE DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS OF STAR PROVIDE THE DIFFERENT
WRITE AND RECOVERY OVERHEADS.
AW start-level Write overhead Recovery overhead
User data (AW-L) High Not recover counterblocks and SIT nodes
Counter block (AW-M) Normal Recover only counter blocks
(N-1)th level (AW-H) Low Recover counterblocks and SIT nodes
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Fig. 7. Different write approaches to flush the SIT node. (a) Traditional
write approach only flushes the evicted node; (b) The Ahead Write approach
flushes the evicted node and its father node, but still keeps the father node in
the metadata cache.
node will not be modified. Moreover, if a node is changed dirty
from clean state in cache, its father node will not be modified.
Based on the above observation, we propose Ahead Write
(AW) approach to ensure the consistency of metadata nodes in
cache and their copies in NVM. Note that if a cached metadata
is consistent with its copy in NVM, the metadata needn’t to be
restored after crashes. As shown in Fig. 7(a), a memory system
only flushes the evicted metadata node itself, and the father
node in cache is modified making the father node different
from its copy in NVM. In our AW approach in Fig. 7(b), we
flush not only the evicted node itself but also its changed father
node. The AW approach updates the father node in NVM, but
doesn’t evict it from cache. It means that the father node is
still in cache and all ancestor nodes are not modified according
to our observation above. Flushing the evicted node and its
changed father node ensures that all the changes occurring in
metadata cache have been flushed into NVM. However, the
AW approach incurs extra 1x write compared with traditional
write approach, i.e., one write for evicted node and one write
for the changed father node. In fact, AW approach can reduce
most extra writes for metadata nodes since the metadata node
to be evicted is latest in NVM. As shown in Fig. 7(b), node A
is evicted from metadata cache before its father node B. When
node A is evicted, AW approach flushes and evicts the node
A and flushes but doesn’t evict its father node B into NVM
(node B is still in cache). Later, when the node B is evicted
from cache, since the latest node B exists in NVM, the AW
approach needn’t to flush the node B into NVM, but discards
it from cache. Instead, the AW approach writes the father node
C, which is modified due to the eviction of node B, into NVM
and still keeps the node C in cache, meaning that node C is
identical to its copy in NVM. If the node B is evicted before its
child node A, the node B has not been modified since its child
node is still in cache. The AW approach discards but doesn’t
flush the node B like traditional approaches. When evicting
a metadata node from cache, AW approach only changes the
state of evicted node to the clean like a normal write, The
state of the modified father node which is written in advance
from cache is still dirty.
In summary, the AW approach incurs two writes on one SIT
node (called start-node) and one write on the ancestor nodes.
Our AW approach manages these start-node in the same level
which we call start-level and incurs one write on the upper
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child node.
levels. The SIT nodes higher than start-level are ensured to be
flushed into NVM as long as they are modified in cache. The
SIT nodes in start-level and lower levels than start-level need
to be recovered after crashes since their copies in NVM are
stale. To meet the requirements of different write and recovery
overheads, STAR tries different AW start- levels. As shown
in Table I, in terms of recovery time, when the user data is
AW start-level (we call this configuration as AW-L), all the
security metadata nodes, i.e., counter blocks and SIT nodes,
are higher than the AW start-level. Thus the metadata nodes
need not to be restored after crashes. When the counter block
is AW start-level (we call this configuration as AW-M), only
the counter blocks need to be restored. Moreover, if the (N-
1)th level of SIT, whose father-level is root, is AW start-level
(we call this configuration as AW-H), all the security metadata
nodes need to be restored. In terms of write overhead, AW-
L introduces high write overhead since every user data write
will incur its father node write, i.e., writing the counter block.
Since the frequency of flushing counter blocks is lower than
that of user data, the write overhead introduced by AW-M is
lower than AW-L. AW-H doesn’t incur extra write overhead
since its father node is root on-chip, which is never written
into NVM.
We analyze the security of the AW approach. As shown in
Fig. 7(b), the node B is ahead written into NVM when the
child node A is evicted from metadata cache. Since the node
C is untouched, attackers can replace the new node B with
the old one and the untouched node C matches both the new
and old node B. Fortunately, during running time, if the latest
node B is in cache, the system will use the correct cached
one instead of reading the replaced node B from NVM. If the
node B is evicted from cache, the corresponding counter in
the father node C is increased by one and the replace attack
could be detected since the replaced node B in can’t match its
father node C in cache. During running time, the AW approach
is secure. However, if the replace attack occurs during the
recovery process, replacing the node B in NVM with the old
one can’t be detected since the latest node B is not in cache
and its father node C has not been modified. Our STAR needs
a mechanism to detect the replace attack during the recovery
process. Moreover, AW-M and AW-H also need to restore the
metadata as shown in Table I.
We further present the counter-MAC synergization, bitmap
lines and cache-tree to restore the stale metadata and verify
the correctness of recovery process.
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C. Restoring the Metadata
The metadata in cache and NVM could be divided into two
types, i.e., clean and dirty nodes. The clean nodes in cache
are the same as their copies in NVM, or the clean nodes have
not been cached only in NVM. The dirty nodes in cache are
different from their copies in NVM since the cached one has
been modified but not been flushed into NVM. In other words,
the clean nodes in NVM are latest and the dirty nodes are
stale. A cache has a dirty bit for each cache line to indicate if
this cache line is consistent with its copy in NVM or not. We
distinguish the clean and dirty nodes by checking the dirty bit.
On recovery, we only need to restore the stale security
metadata nodes in NVM. One key observation is that in SIT
lazy update scheme (detailed in Section II-C), when data is
evicted from cache, only the corresponding counter in the
father node of the evicted data is increased by one. The MAC
in the father node is modified, and other nodes are untouched
as shown in Fig. 8(a). After obtaining the correct copy of the
modified counter, we re-compute the correct MAC by hashing
the counters in this node and one corresponding counter in
the father node. Moreover, a MAC needs to be persisted with
data to associate the data with its father node. For example,
if the latest user data MAC has not been persisted, the data
can’t be used after recovery since the stale MAC can’t match
the latest data and counters stored in NVM. As described
in Section II-D, 54-bit MAC is also secure [23] and 10 bits
are unused in the 64-bit MAC space. STAR leverages these
unused bits of MAC in the child node to store 10 LSBs of
the corresponding counter in the father node, as shown in
Fig. 8(b). When a dirty node is to be written, its corresponding
counter in the father node increases by 1. STAR stores the 10
LSBs of the modified counter in the unused space of the MAC
to be written, which is called counter-MAC synergization. The
10 LSBs of a modified counter is flushed with the child node
as long as the child node eviction causes the modification of
counter in the father node. To protect the LSBs, MAC in a node
is computed by hashing this node, the address of the node, the
corresponding counter in the father node and the LSBs stored
in the MAC space. When one counter in a node has been
increased 210 times, the node needs to be flushed into NVM
to update the 44 Most Significant Bits (MSBs). This counter
overflow is rare and introduces negligible overheads.
STAR obtains the correct LSBs of counter in the dirty node
from its child nodes. Combined with the MSBs stored in the
corresponding counter in the stale node, the stale counter is
correctly restored and the MAC in the node could be re-
computed. However, like the AW approach, restoring node
according to counter-MAC synergization suffers from data re-
place attack. For example, when recovering a counter block of
one user data, attackers could replace the user data, MAC and
LSBs with old tuple and the modifications can’t be detected
as described in Section III-E. The counter-MAC synergization
also requires a mechanism to verify the correctness of recovery
process as the AW approach.
bitmap line
ADR region in MC
bitmap line
 
bitmap line
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LRU flush
NVM RA(recovery area)
Fig. 9. Bitmap lines are placed in ADR in Memory Controller and flushed into
NVM recovery area (RA) by LRU. Each bitmap line covers 32KB metadata
space.
D. Tracking the Stale Node Location
The locations of stale nodes in NVM are necessary for
fast recovery. Without the locations, all the metadata nodes
in NVM need to be restored due to staleness. To efficiently
record the locations of the stale metadata nodes, bitmap lines
are presented in Fig. 9. One bit in the bitmap line represents
a security metadata line, e.g., the first and last bits in the
first bitmap line represent the 1st and 512th metadata lines in
metadata space. Each bitmap line covers 32KB continuous
metadata space since one memory line contains 512 bits
(512×64B=32KB).
To ensure the persistence of bitmap lines, STAR leverages
the asynchronous DRAM refresh (ADR) mechanism. Modern
processor vendors provide a small battery backup for ADR
with tens of entries [18], [26] in memory controller. When
the system crash occurs, the data stored in ADR could be
flushed into NVM by battery backup support. STAR places
a certain number of the bitmap lines in ADR (default is 16
lines). When a metadata line becomes dirty from the clean
state according to its ’dirty bit’, the corresponding bitmap line
bit is set to 1, If a dirty metadata line is written from cache
making it become clean from the dirty state, the corresponding
bitmap line bit will be reset. If the bitmap lines in ADR don’t
cover one metadata line, whose corresponding bit is in another
bitmap line, STAR flushes one bitmap line from ADR to the
Recovery Area (RA) in NVM by LRU policy and creates a
new bitmap line to record the state of metadata line. Note
that when creating a new bitmap line, all the metadata cache
lines covered by the new bitmap line should be traversed to
identify the states. These states need to be recorded in the
corresponding bits in the new bitmap line. Thus STAR never
reads bitmap lines from RA during running time. RA in NVM
is allocated to store all the bitmap lines, and consumes a
negligible 1/512 space of the metadata space.
For AW-L and AW-M, although the cached nodes in the
levels higher than the start-level are the same as their copies
in NVM, STAR also sets/resets the corresponding bits to 1/0
in bitmap lines according to the ’dirty bit’ when their child
nodes/these nodes are flushed. This address information is
used to verify the correctness of recovery process (detailed
in Section III-G).
E. Using Cache-Tree to Verify Recovery Process
STAR restores stale metadata nodes according to the
counter-MAC synergization. However, attackers can replace
the data, MAC and LSBs with an old tuple to disable the
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Fig. 11. A multi-layer index structure is used to read the non-zero bitmap
lines and stale metadata nodes.
recovery without a system detection. For example, a user data
with the LSBs 0x11 and MAC is written into NVM. During
recovery, restoring its father counter block needs the LSB
0x11, but attackers replace the tuple with old data, old MAC
and old LSBs 0x10. The replace attack can’t be detected since
the MAC in the user data matches the old tuple of data and
LSBs and a wrong MAC is re-computed in the counter block.
To detect this attack, we need a mechanism to verify if the
recovery process is correct or not.
We notice that modern cache usually is a set-way structure.
An 8-way cache is divided into multiple sets. Each set has 8
ways and each way contains one cache line. A specific memory
line is cached into a specific set and placed in any way in this
set. As shown in Fig. 10, STAR constructs a cache-tree by
using the dirty node MACs to verify the correctness of the
recovery process. MACs in dirty nodes in one set are first
ordered by the descending addresses. Then the set-MAC is
computed by hashing these ordered MACs of the dirty nodes
as shown in Fig. 10(a). Finally, a merkle tree is constructed
by iteratively hashing these set-MACs as shown Fig. 10(b)
(called cache-tree). The cache-tree needs to be updated when a
modification/eviction of dirty node occurs. If no dirty metadata
lines are in one set, STAR uses zero -bytes as the set-MAC to
construct the cache-tree. Note that STAR logically constructs
the cache-tree without moving any cache line. STAR doesn’t
add an 8-byte space at each set. The set-MACs and cache-tree
nodes existing in metadata cache with SIT nodes and counter
blocks, and can also be evicted from cache. Note that the
cache-tree nodes in cache are not involved in the set-MAC
generation. The cache-tree root is always on chip just like a
traditional merkle tree root. On recovery, STAR reconstructs
the cache-tree. The replace attack will cause a wrong data
MAC and be detected by the cache-tree root as shown in
Section III-G.
F. Using Multi-layer Index to Speed Up Recovery
To locate the stale metadata node in NVM, STAR needs
to read all bitmap lines in RA. For a 16-GB NVM, the RA
occupies 1/512 space of the metadata space, i.e., RA occupies
a 4-MB NVM space. However, reading the 4-MB RA needs
long latency compared with Anubis that only needs to read
Shadow Table whose size is the same as that of metadata
cache. To speed up STAR recovery process, we observe that
only the locations of the stale nodes are needed. Even all the
metadata cache lines are stale, a larger part of the bitmap
lines in RA are useless during recovery, since bitmap lines
are designed to cover all the metadata space, which is much
bigger than the metadata cache. Reading the zero lines which
don’t record the locations of stale node from RA is useless and
time-consuming. It is better to only read the non-zero bitmap
lines instead of reading all lines from RA.
To speed up reading RA, we propose a multi-layer index, as
shown in Fig. 11. STAR leverages L1 bitmap lines to indicate
which security metadata lines are stale and L2 bitmap lines
to indicate which L1 bitmap lines are non-zero. If necessary,
STAR can add L3 bitmap lines and so on. We call this structure
multi-layer index. STAR stores the highest-layer bitmap lines
on chip as SIT root and never flushes it into NVM. To
reduce the consuming of on-chip space, the number of bitmap
lines in the highest layer is always one. Other-layer lines
are in ADR in the memory controller and flushed into RA
by LRU like the bitmap lines described in Section III-D,
consuming the negligible NVM space. A 1-/2-/3-layer index
can cover 32KB/16MB/8GB metadata space. In our evaluation,
we model 16GB main memory (about 2GB metadata) and the
3-layer index is sufficient.
G. Recovery Process
After crashes, the security metadata need to be recovered to
the latest state. To recover the stale security metadata, STAR
first reads the multi-layer index from RA to obtain the non-
zero L1 bitmap lines. According to the L1 bitmap lines, STAR
distinguishes the stale metadata node in metadata space. For
different configurations of the AW approach, the number of
nodes that need to be restored is different. For example, AW-
H needs to restore all the stale nodes recorded by the bitmap
lines; AW-M only restores the counter blocks and AW-L never
restores any security metadata nodes although their locations
have been recorded in the bitmap lines.
STAR recovers the stale SIT nodes and counter blocks from
top to down. When restoring one stale metadata node, since
we don’t know which counter is dirty, all the LSBs from the 8
child nodes and the corresponding counter in the father node
need to be read to restore the 8 counters and MAC in this node.
Then STAR caches all the MACs of metadata nodes recorded
by bitmap lines, orders them by the descending addresses in
a set, generates the set-MACs and reconstructs the cache-
tree root. A replace attack during recovery process makes the
recalculated MAC wrong. The wrong MAC is read into cache
and reconstructs a wrong cache-tree root. Finally, the system
verifies the recovery process by matching the recalculated
cache-tree root and the cache-tree root stored on chip. If the
two roots are not matched, the system recovery fails.
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IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first show the configurations of our
simulation. We then present the experimental results and
analysis.
A. Evaluation Methodology
TABLE II
THE CONFIGURATIONS OF THE NVM SYSTEM.
Processor
CPU 4 cores, X86-64 processor, 2 GHz
Private L1 cache 64KB, 2-way, LRU, 64B Block
Private L2 cache 512KB, 8-way, LRU, 64B Block
Shared L3 cache 4MB, 8-way, LRU, 64B Block
DDR-based PCM Main Memory
Capacity 16GB
PCM latency model Read 60ns, Write 150ns
Secure Parameters
Counter Cache 256KB, 8-Way, 64B Block, in MC
SIT Cache 256KB, 8-Way, 64B Block, in MC
SIT 10 levels, including the counter node and root,8-ary, 64B Block
To evaluate the performance of STAR, we use Gem5 [5]
with NVMain [19] to model the system. NVMain is a cycle-
accurate main memory simulator for emerging NVM tech-
nologies. As illustrated in Table II, we simulate a 4 core
X86 processor. The NVM system contains 32KB L1 data and
instruction caches, 512KB L2 and 4MB shared L3 caches.
Both the counter cache and SIT cache are 256KB, which
serve as metadata cache managed by memory controller [39].
We use 16GB PCM-based main memory with the read/write
latency of 60ns/150ns like existing schemes [4], [31], [37]. We
use 8 representative applications from SPEC 2006 benchmark
suite [11] to simulate 5 billion instructions for each applica-
tion, and five persistent workloads which are widely used in
existing schemes in persistent memory [8], [12], [13], [18],
[21], [38], to evaluate the performance of STAR. The five
persistent workloads are as followings.
1) array. Initializing a 1GB array and then randomly swap-
ping entries.
2) btree. Inserting random key-value items into a 1GB B-
tree based key-vaule store.
3) hash. Inserting random key-value items into a 1GB hash
table based key-value store.
4) queue. Randomly enqueueing and dequeueing entries in
a 1GB queue.
5) rbtree. Inserting random key-value items into a 1GB red-
black tree.
To comprehensively examine the performance of our pro-
posed STAR, we evaluate the following schemes for compar-
isons.
• A write back metadata cache (WB). It uses an ideal
write-back metadata cache in which only the evicted data
from metadata cache is flushed into NVM. Since not all
changed metadata are persistent, the WB scheme doesn’t
support recovery after system crashes.
• A strict persistence scheme (Strict Persistence): Strict
Persistence scheme persists all the changed nodes from
the modified counter block up to the root of SIT.
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Fig. 12. The number of writes of Bitmap Lines in STAR compared with that
of WB (normalized to Bitmap Lines).
• Anubis for SGX Integrity Tree (ASIT) scheme (Anubis):
ASIT scheme is designed for SIT in Anubis. An ST block,
in which ASIT records the address of dirty metadata,
correct counters and MAC, is written into NVM with
each memory write.
• AW-L: The AW start-level of AW-L is the user data
level. AW-L incurs 2 writes when writing user data and
only needs to verify the correctness of recovery process
without restoring stale metadata.
• AW-M: The AW start-level of AW-M is the counter block
level. AW-M incurs 2 writes when writing counter blocks
and needs to restore the stale counter blocks.
• AW-H: The AW start-level of AW-H is the (N-1)th level.
AW-H needs to restore all the stale metadata, including
the counter blocks and SIT nodes.
Our STAR doesn’t switch the AW start-level during runtime.
The different configurations of the AW approach meet different
requirements of write and recovery overheads.
Note that since Osiris and Triad-NVM can’t be used to
recover the counter blocks and integrity tree nodes in SIT
persistent memory, we don’t compare our STAR with them.
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Fig. 13. The number of all memory writes in different schemes (normalized
to WB).
B. Performance Results and Analysis
The overall write overhead of STAR consists of bitmap
lines writes, ahead writes and normal memory line writes. We
present the overhead of the bitmap lines writes and all write
overheads of STAR compared with other schemes.
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Fig. 12 shows the number of bitmap lines writes of STAR
scheme compared with the WB scheme. The number of bitmap
lines in ADR is 16, consisting of 2 L2 bitmap lines and 14 L1
bitmap lines. STAR flushes the bitmap lines to NVM since
there is a bitmap line miss and one line should be evicted
into RA by LRU. Fig. 12 shows that the overhead of the
bitmap lines writes in STAR is negligible compared with
WB. On average, the number of WB writes is 461x more
than that of Bitmap lines writes. This is because one bitmap
line covers 8-page metadata address (512 * 64B = 32KB).
When the memory writes of applications have a high spatial
locality, STAR rarely evicts a bitmap line. The most bitmap
lines writes are caused by security metadata lines evicted
from metadata cache since they have lower spatial locality
than user data. Fig. 12 shows that in different workloads,
the numbers of bitmap lines writes become different, which
depend on two factors, i.e., the number and the spatial locality
of this workload writing. The more user data is written and
the higher the spatial locality of memory writes is, the bitmap
lines consumes less write overhead compared with WB.
Fig 13 shows the overall number of memory writes for
different schemes. The numbers of memory writes in Anu-
bis/strict persistence scheme are the sum of traditional mem-
ory writes(i.e., the writes in WB scheme) and ST block
writes/nodes in a branch of tree writes in SIT (the depth of
SIT in 16GB persistent memory is 10, including counter block
and root). Note that the number of strict persistence scheme
writes is less than 9 times the WB, since the root is not flushed,
and the tree nodes also need to be evicted in the WB scheme
according to cache replacement policy. Compared with the
baseline WB scheme, the number of memory writes of AW-
H/AW-M/AW-L is 1.13x/1.29x/2.01x, while Anubis writes 2x
memory lines than WB. The extra memory writes in AW-H
are introduced by writing bitmap lines. Unlike AW-H, AW-M
and AW-L have more memory writes caused by memory line
ahead writes when writing nodes in the start-level. For AW-L,
flushing user data will incur its counter block ahead writing,
and for AW-M, only every counter block writing incurs its
father node ahead writing. Since the frequency of flushing
user data is higher than that of flushing counter blocks, AW-
L writes more extra memory lines than AW-M and AW-H.
Moreover, AW-L writes a similar number of memory lines
with Anubis, but consumes less recovery time as shown in
Section IV-D.
C. Sensitivity to the Number of Bitmap Lines in ADR
A bitmap line in ADR can cover 8 memory pages since
one bitmap line contains 512 bits and one bit represents one
memory line. More bitmap lines in ADR cover more metadata
space, thus increasing the hit ratio of the bitmap lines. Table III
shows the average hit ratio of over 13 workloads among 2, 4,
8, 16 and 32 bitmap lines in ADR. The hit ratio is not too
high because the system tries to access the bitmap lines only
when the state of one metadata line is changed. For example,
a user data is written into NVM making its corresponding
counter block dirty from the clean state. The location of this
counter block needs to be recorded in the bitmap lines. Next,
TABLE III
THE HIT RATIOS OF DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF BITMAP LINES PLACED IN
ADR (2, 4, 8, 16 AND 32).
Bitmap Lines 2 4 8 16 32
Hit Ratio 32.85% 47.44% 64.37% 74.75% 82.19%
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Fig. 14. The percentage of dirty nodes in metadata cache on different
workloads.
the neighbor user data with the same counter block is written.
Since the counter block has been already dirty and the state
of the counter block is untouched, the system doesn’t need to
access the bitmap lines and record this location again. When
the dirty metadata is evicted from cache, the system records its
location in a bitmap line due to its state changing from dirty
to the clean state. But the system will not access a bitmap line
when a clean metadata is evicted. If the bitmap lines record
all locations of the evicted nodes and their father nodes, no
matter their states are changed or not, the hit ratio will be high,
with some useless bitmap lines access. Table III shows that,
the more the number of bitmap lines exists in ADR, the higher
the hit ratio becomes. A higher hit ratio causes less number
of bitmap lines written. Considering that the ADR region on
chip is expensive and the improvement of hit ratio decreases
with more bitmap lines, we choose to place 16 bitmap lines
in ADR.
D. Recovery time
To recover the stale node, STAR first reads the non-zero
L1 bitmap lines according to the multi-layer index to obtain
the locations of stale metadata node. STAR further recovers
the stale nodes by reading its father node and 8 child nodes
to restore the counters and MAC in the stale node. Finally,
the cache-tree is reconstructed to verify the correctness of
the recovery process. Like Anubis and Osiris [33], [37], we
assume fetching one node from NVM to cache and updating it
would consume 100ns. The recovery time consists of fetching
metadata nodes from memory and reconstructing the cache-
tree. The latency of reading father node and child nodes
dominates the recovery time.
Fig. 14 shows the percentage of dirty nodes in metadata
cache. When system crashes occur, these dirty nodes need to
be restored. STAR needs to read 62% nodes of cache instead
of 100% read in Anubis. STAR further provides three different
configurations for different write overheads and recovery time,
i.e., AW-L, AW-M and AW-H. AW-L doesn’t need to restore
metadata node, and only needs to verify the correctness of
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configurations of STAR and Anubis.
recovery process, thus introducing short recovery time. For
verifying the correctness of recovery process, AW-L needs to
read the MAC of dirty node and reconstruct the cache-tree. In
addition to the verification of recovery process, AW-M needs
to restore the stale counter blocks and AW-H has to restore all
the stale metadata, including counter blocks and SIT nodes.
Fig. 15 shows the recovery time after system crashes of
different schemes. For a 4MB metadata cache, AW-H/AW-
M/AW-L needs 0.039s/0.023s/0.004s to recover the stale se-
curity metadata while Anubis needs 0.020s. Compared with
Anubis, AW-H needs 1.99x recovery time, AW-M needs 1.15x
and AW-L needs 0.20x. During the recovery process, Anubis
reads the ST blocks and their number is equal to that of
metadata cache lines. According to the ST blocks, all the
metadata in metadata cache and the father nodes of these
metadata are read to be restored by Anubis, no matter the
metadata is stale or not in NVM. Therefore, for a 4MB
metadata cache, Anubis reads 196,608 lines from NVM (3x
than the number of lines in 4MB metadata cache) during
recovery process. Unlike Anubis, AW-L reads the negligible
bitmap lines (about 150 lines in our experiments) and dirty
metadata in metadata cache (about 62% number of metadata
cache lines) to verify the recovery process. AW-M and AW-H
read more memory lines for recovery due to restoring stale
nodes. AW-M restores the stale counter blocks while AW-
H restores all the stale metadata nodes. Restoring each dirty
metadata node needs to read 10 related nodes, including 1
dirty node to be restored, 1 father node and 8 child nodes.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss the prior works related with our
STAR.
Recovery in NVM. To use the data persisted in NVM after
system crashes, a secure persistent memory system needs to
recover the security metadata. Osiris [33] recovers the counter
blocks by retrying counter and leverages error-correction codes
to verify the correctness of recovered counter blocks. Since
Osiris writes a counter block into NVM when one counter in
this block has been increased by N times, Osiris has fewer
writes than conventional write back schemes. cc-NVM [31]
caches the flushed counter blocks in write pending queue with
a battery in an epoch and only flushes these blocks at the end
of one epoch. cc-NVM also retries the counter to obtain the
correct one. Unlike Osiris, cc-NVM uses MAC to verify which
counter is correct. To recover a merkle tree, Triad-NVM [4]
flushes the n lowest level tree nodes and counter blocks with
the user data writes. On recovery, Triad-NVM reconstructs
the whole tree from the flushed tree nodes instead of user
data. Anubis [37] provides a fast recovery scheme for merkle
tree and SGX integrity tree by recording the addresses of the
changed metadata in a shadow table block and flushing the
shadow table block with user data. Anubis only recovers the
cached nodes before crashes according to shadow table blocks
and reduces the recovery time.
Secure NVM. Unlike DRAM, NVM suffers from the data
remanence vulnerability and limited lifetime. Ensuring data
confidentiality with low write overhead in NVM is necessary.
DEUCE [34] proposes a dual-counter scheme. In one epoch,
DEUCE uses the old counter to encrypt the untouched words
and new counter to encrypt the changed words in a cache
line, which reduces the write traffic since the untouched words
needn’t to be written by executing DCW [30] and FNW [7]
techniques. Based on DEUCE, SECRET [27] further reduces
the zero-content words writes in NVM by flushing a zero-flag.
Silent Shredder [3] observes that zeroing out physical pages
before mapping to processor consumes a large percentage
of memory writes. They repurpose initialization vectors of
counter mode encryption to eliminate the data shredding
writes. SuperMem [39] uses a write-through counter cache
to ensure the counter crash consistency and proposes counter
write coalescing (CWC) scheme to reduce the number of
counter writes.
Unlike existing schemes, STAR reduces the number of the
SIT nodes and counter blocks that need to be recovered to
achieve low recovery and write overheads. Moreover, Our
STAR is orthogonal with SuperMem, and the CWC scheme
can be used in the AW-L to further reduce the number of
memory writes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes STAR to reduce the high recovery
time and write overhead of recovering the SGX integrity tree
nodes and counter blocks in the secure non-volatile memories.
STAR leverages Ahead Write (AW) scheme to provide the
consistency between the nodes in metadata cache and their
copies in NVM. Furthermore, to efficiently restore the dirty
metadata and verify the recovery process, STAR judiciously
exploits the unused space in MAC in one node to store
the LSBs of the corresponding counter in the father node,
and leverages bitmap lines in ADR to show the locations of
stale metadata nodes. Moreover, a cache-tree is constructed to
ensure the correctness of the recovery process and a multi-
layer index is introduced to speed up recovering stale nodes.
Experimental results show that compared with state-of-the-art
work, STAR reduces the number of memory writes by up to
87% with a short recovery time.
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